Transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy. This paper analyzes the reputational incentives related to transparency, focusing on the publication of central bank forecasts. A simple dynamic monetary policy game shows how transparency reduces inflation, as has been found empirically. Furthermore, the endogenous choice of transparency is analyzed. Although transparency exposes weak central banks, the negative market feedback in response to secrecy could provide a sufficiently strong inducement to become transparent. Thus, reputational concerns could lead to transparency, even without formal disclosure requirements.
Introduction
Transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy. A comprehensive survey of 94 central banks by Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger and Sterne (2000) reveals that 74% of central banks consider transparency a vital or very important component of their monetary policy framework, and that 78% publish forward-looking analysis. This paper analyzes the reputational incentives associated with transparency, focusing on the publication of central bank forecasts. It predicts a negative relation between transparency and inflation, as has been found empirically. Furthermore, it shows how transparency could arise endogenously, which helps to explain why transparency (in monetary policy, but also in other contexts) often goes beyond formal disclosure requirements.
More precisely, the paper shows how transparency about economic forecasts improves the central bank's incentive to build reputation. Intuitively, the interest rate set by the central bank reflects both its inflationary intentions and the economic shocks it anticipates. Under transparency, people observe the central bank's economic forecasts, so the interest rate provides a more accurate signal of the central bank's intentions. This makes the expectations of the public more responsive to the central bank's attempt to build reputation through higher interest rates. So, transparency improves the central bank's ability to gain and maintain reputation. In addition, since the market pays more attention to the signals from transparent central banks, they invest more in reputation. This leads to a lower inflation bias, which is socially beneficial.
Nevertheless, a weak, inflationary central bank prefers opacity about its forecasts because it obscures its true intent. However, when the choice of transparency is endogenous, secrecy is associated with weakness and harms a central bank's reputation. This negative market feedback could be sufficient to induce all central banks to adopt transparency, which is the key contribution of this paper. This mechanism applies more generally and is useful to understand how (international) financial markets could impose transparency in other contexts.
The model in this paper is in the tradition of the discretionary monetary policy games first described by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and later formalized by Barro and Gordon (1983) . It is a simple two-period model in which there is some uncertainty about the central bank's preferences and the central bank has a motive to stimulate output beyond the natural rate. In contrast to most previous models, there is a real interest rate transmission mechanism, so the nominal interest rate acts as both the policy instrument and a signal of the central bank's intentions. In addition, there is an explicit distinction between a regime of opacity and transparency. The latter corresponds to the publication of central bank forecasts, which reveals the economic disturbances to which policymakers respond and allows the public to infer the central bank's intentions from the policy instrument.
In a more general context, transparency refers to the absence of information asymmetries. This paper builds on insights from information economics (see Stiglitz (2000) for a recent overview) and contributes to the literature on transparency of monetary policy by incorporating both a reputation and a selfselection/signaling effect.
First, transparency affects the central bank's incentive to build reputation. There is rational updating of the central bank's type based on observable policy actions, similar to Backus and Driffill (1985) , Barro (1986) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) . The result that transparency leads to greater sensitivity of inflation expectations and reduces the inflation bias is common to Faust and Svensson (2001) and Jensen (2002 Jensen ( , 2000 . However, they consider inference based on policy outcomes (complicated by unanticipated monetary control errors), whereas the present paper focuses on the private sector response to policy actions (which reflect anticipated economic shocks). This is motivated by the fact that interest rate decisions are scrutinized by the market for clues about future monetary policy. In addition, it helps to explain why central banks tend to publish forecasts for both inflation and output, which is puzzling in light of the literature on inflation-forecast targeting (e.g. Svensson 1997 ).
Second, a novel effect analyzed in this paper is that the choice of transparency gives rise to signaling and self-selection. When the transparency regime is endogenous, the public rationally expects opaque central banks to be more inflationary, which harms their reputation and leads to higher inflation expectations. This leads to the main result of the paper that market discipline could cause even weak central banks to choose transparency because of reputational concerns.
The burgeoning theoretical literature on transparency of monetary policy has obtained a variety of findings, depending on the assumptions of the model and the particular information asymmetry under consideration. A comprehensive survey is provided by Geraats (2002) . The present paper is about 'economic transparency', the disclosure of the economic information that is used for policy decisions, in particular central bank forecasts. Tarkka and Mayes (1999) argue that the publication of central bank forecasts could reduce (mutual) uncertainty about expectations and lead to greater predictability of monetary policy. On the other hand, Gersbach (1998 ), Cukierman (2001 and Jensen (2000) show that transparency about economic disturbances could hamper stabilization policy when the disclosure of shocks leads to an adjustment of inflation expectations that negatively affects the current output-inflation trade-off. Jensen (2000) adopts a newKeynesian Phillips curve, whereas Gersbach (1998) and Cukierman (2001) use a neo-monetarist Lucas-type transmission mechanism in which (central bank forecasts of) economic disturbances are observed before private sector inflation ex-pectations are fixed.
In contrast to Gersbach (1998) and Cukierman (2001) , the present paper assumes that there is some preference uncertainty which gives rise to a beneficial incentive effect of transparency that reduces the inflation bias. A similar result is found by Faust and Svensson (2001) and Jensen (2002) who focus on a different kind of transparency, the disclosure of information on monetary control errors. Although Faust and Svensson (2001) find that increased transparency of control errors tends to improve social welfare, Faust and Svensson (2002) argue that minimum transparency is a likely outcome in practice when the regime is endogenous. However, they do not consider self-selection effects, which could provide a powerful incentive for central banks to adopt transparency.
The analysis in this paper relies on three important presumptions. First, there is uncertainty about the central bank's intentions. For analytical convenience this is modeled as uncertainty about the inflation target. Although many central banks have announced explicit inflation targets, these are often formulated as ranges. Moreover, they need not be perfectly credible. Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) provide anecdotal support for this by showing that explicit inflation targets affect inflation expectations only gradually. In fact, there is always likely to be some uncertainty about the central bank's intentions because they cannot be directly observed and may change over time.
Second, it is assumed that there is asymmetric information about economic disturbances. Romer and Romer (2000) present empirical evidence for this. They show that confidential Federal Reserve forecasts of inflation are superior to commercial forecasts, even at a short horizon of one or two quarters ahead. This suggests that the central bank has private information about economic disturbances. This could be due to confidential information not available to the private sector, like bank supervisory data (Peek, Rosengren and Tootell 1999) , or the economic analysis by central bank staff. Although the present model assumes that the central bank has more accurate information, the conclusions even hold when the private sector is merely unsure of the central bank's forecasts of economic shocks.
Finally, it is assumed that central bank forecasts are truthful and that people are able to interpret them correctly. Instead, Winkler (2002) argues that effective communication is not trivial; he proposes to view transparency in terms of openness, clarity, honesty and common understanding. In addition, Garfinkel and Oh (1995) assume that central bank forecasts cannot be verified and show how a central bank could partially reveal its private information through noisy announcements. The present paper adopts the approach proposed by Goodfriend (1986, p. 86) and assumes that the data collection, modeling and forecasting activities performed by central bank staff are delegated to an independent agency that reports to both monetary policymakers and the public in the case of transparency. Thus, the forecasts are in principle verifiable.
An alternative to transparency that reduces the inflation bias would be the implementation of an instrument rule that incorporates the central bank's information on economic disturbances. However, central banks appear extremely reluctant to adopt instrument rules. One reason is that rules do not allow a central bank to respond to unforeseen contingencies or changes in the structure of the economy. Instead, many central banks appear to conduct discretionary policy under transparency, which yields a lower inflation bias without giving up control.
The next section presents the model, which is analyzed first for an exogenous regime of transparency and opacity in section 3, and subsequently for the endogenous choice of regime in section 4. The robustness of the results and empirical evidence are discussed in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
Model
The central banker is in office for two periods and maximizes the expected value of the objective function
where δ is the subjective discount factor (0 < δ < 1), and
where π t is inflation; y t is the level of aggregate real output; τ is the implicit inflation target, drawn from the (nondegenerate) normal distribution: τ ∼ N (τ,σ 2 τ ) with σ 2 τ > 0;ȳ equals the natural rate of output; β is the relative weight on output stimulation (β > 0); and the subscript t denotes the time period, t ∈ {1, 2}. The economy is described by two equations. Aggregate demand is given by the IS relationship
where i t is the nominal interest rate; π e t denotes the market's inflation expectations;r is the long-run, ex ante real interest rate; and, d t is a white noise demand shock:
Aggregate supply is given by the price adjustment equation
where s t is a white noise supply shock:
For analytical convenience, it is assumed that s t , d t and τ are independent. Without loss of generality, the slopes of the aggregate demand and supply relations (3) and (4) are normalized to one. The timing of the model, which is illustrated in figure 1 , is as follows. Before the first period, the inflation target τ is drawn, but only known to the central bank. Subsequently, the central bank chooses a regime of transparency (T ) The model features asymmetric information. The public is uncertain about the central bank's inflation target τ, which is indicated by the dotted circle in figure 1. In addition, its inflation expectations π e t are formed before the shocks d t and s t are realized. Moreover, in the case of opacity, the public cannot observe the economic disturbances d t and s t , which is indicated by the dashed ellipses in figure 1 .
It is assumed that the public has rational expectations. Formally, the information set available to the public when it forms its inflation expectations π difference is that in the case of transparency the public observes the economic disturbances to which the central bank reacts.
The public uses the interest rate i 1 to infer the central bank's inflation target τ. It is assumed that inflation π 1 and output y 1 are not observed until after inflation expectations π e 2 are formed because of lags associated with the publication of macroeconomic data or the transmission of monetary policy. This captures the fact that in practice, people only know the macroeconomic effect of a change in the policy instrument after a substantial delay. Meanwhile, people adjust their expectations π e 2 based on the policy instrument i 1 , which sets the stage for the next policy decision.
The model is solved in two steps. In section 3, the transparency regime is assumed to be exogenous. In section 4, the choice of regime is endogenous.
Exogenous Regime
The case of an exogenous transparency regime is interesting in itself because central banks tend to be subject to some legislative disclosure requirements. Exogeneity of the regime precludes self-selection, so it is assumed that the public's prior on the inflation target isτ under both transparency and opacity.
The problem can be solved by backwards induction. In period two, the central bank maximizes W 2 with respect to i 2 subject to (4) and (3), and given π e 2 , d 2 and s 2 . The first order condition implies
The nominal interest rate i 2 (and the ex ante real interest rate i 2 −π e 2 ) is increasing in the market's inflation expectations π e 2 and the demand shock d 2 , but decreasing in the supply shock s 2 . Substituting (5) into (3) and (4) yields
Output y 2 is decreasing in inflation expectations π e 2 and increasing in the output supply shock s 2 . The demand shock d 2 is completely offset by monetary policy. Since the objective function is linear in output, the supply shock s 2 does not influence the level of inflation π 2 and there is an inflationary bias (π 2 > τ) of discretionary monetary policy. Substituting (7) and (6) into (2) gives
This shows that the central bank benefits from lower inflation expectations π e 2 . Thus, it has an incentive to improve its reputation through its actions in period one.
In the first period, the central bank uses (2) and (8) to maximize the expected value of its objective function (1) with respect to i 1 subject to (4) and (3), and given π e 1 , d 1 and s 1 . But now it also takes into account the effect of i 1 on W 2 through π e 2 , because the private sector updates its inflation expectations π e 2 using the policy instrument i 1 . This is the crucial mechanism that generates reputation effects. It is assumed that people use the following linear updating rule with constant coefficients u and v, which is shown to be consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium in sections 3.1 and 3.2:
The first order condition with respect to i 1 implies
This expression for the nominal interest rate is similar to the one for the second period in (5), except for the last term on the right-hand side. This term reflects the reputation effect of the interest rate on inflation expectations in the next period.
To proceed it is necessary to distinguish between the regimes of transparency and opacity.
Transparency
In this paper, transparency refers to the publication of central bank forecasts, which provides information on the economic disturbances d t and s t that affect the central bank's behavior. Thus, people are able to infer the central bank's intentions from its actions. It is useful to make a distinction between conditional forecasts that are based on an explicit level (or path) of the interest rate, and unconditional forecasts, which constitute the best estimate given the information that is available but are based on an anticipated interest rate (path) that is not specified.
To see how the publication of conditional central bank forecasts contributes to economic transparency, let i C denote the interest rate that is used for the conditional forecast. Then the public can use the conditional central bank forecast for output y C t , its inflation expectations π e t and (3) to deduce (the central bank's forecast of) the demand shock d t . Similarly, (the central bank's forecast of) the supply shock s t follows from the conditional central bank forecast for inflation π C t , y C t , π e t and (4). Note that it is generally necessary to disclose forecasts for both output and inflation to identify demand and supply shocks. In contrast to the literature on inflation forecast targeting pioneered by Svensson (1997) , output forecasts play an important role for transparency. This may explain why central banks tend to publish inflation as well as output forecasts.
Perhaps surprisingly, the publication of unconditional forecasts does not necessarily have the same effect as that of conditional forecasts, an issue which is briefly discussed in section 3.3. For the rest of the paper, (economic) transparency corresponds to the publication of conditional central bank forecasts.
Under a regime of transparency, indicated by superscript T , the public knows i 1 , d 1 and s 1 when it forms its inflation expectations π e 2 . It can therefore infer the inflation target τ (ex post) from the interest rate i 1 using (10). Rational expectations and (7) then imply
where moment operators with subscript t ∈ {0, 1} and superscripts R ∈ {T,O} are conditional on the information set Ω R t . Substituting (11) into (5), (6) and (7) gives the interest rate, output and inflation in the second period:
To get the outcomes in the first period, the reputation coefficient v must be computed. Under transparency, solving (10) for τ, substituting into (11) and matching coefficients with (9) yields 3,4
Thus, it is established that this is indeed a rational expectations equilibrium. 4 Note that (11) may give the impression that v T = 0 is also a solution. However, τ is not directly observable; it can only be inferred indirectly from i 1 , d 1 and s 1 . As a result, π e 2 does depend on i 1 . For a formal proof that v T = 0 cannot be a rational expectations equilibrium, see appendix B.
5 Multiple rational expectations equilibria may exist. However, this is the only one that satisfies the McCallum (1983) criterion to employ a minimal set of state variables in the updating equation.
first-period outcomes are obtained by substituting (15) into (10), using (3) and (4), and imposing rational expectations, (π
The first period is different from the second period for two reasons. First, expectations of the inflation target τ are updated. In the first period, the uncertainty about the central bank's inflation target makes the level of output y T 1 dependent on the central bank's type τ, because a higher inflation target reduces the interest rate and thereby raises output. But in the second period, transparency has allowed the public to infer the inflation target, so output y T 2 no longer depends on the central bank's type τ as E
The second difference is the reputation effect that decreases both the nominal interest rate and inflation in period one. The effect on the interest rate may seem counter-intuitive. However, for a given level of inflation expectations π e 1 , the central bank chooses a higher (nominal and ex ante real) interest rate, and thereby lower output and lower inflation, in period one to reduce inflation expectations in period two. The lower level of inflation in period one is anticipated and reduces inflation expectations π e 1 . This decreases the (nominal and ex ante real) interest rate. Rational expectations ensure that the negative effect on output in period one is completely offset, so there is no net effect on the ex ante real interest rate. As a result, lower inflation expectations give rise to a lower nominal interest rate in period one. The effect of reputation on inflation is more familiar. Although the ex ante real interest rate is the same, the lower level of inflation expectations π e 1 reduces the level of inflation, partly eliminating the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy: τ < π
Substituting (11) into (8), and using (18) and (17), the expected payoff to the central bank in the case of transparency equals
It shows that the central bank's expected payoff is decreasing in the inflation target expected by the public,
, which is important for the self-selection effect when the regime is endogenous.
Opacity
To appreciate the benefits of transparency it is important to look at the case of opacity as well. Under a regime of opacity, indicated by superscript O, the public updates its prior on the inflation target τ from the policy instrument i 1 , although it is no longer able to perfectly infer the central bank's intentions. Use rational expectations, (7), (10) and the fact that i 1 and π e 2 are jointly normally distributed because of their common dependence on τ, to get
Matching coefficients between (20) and (9) yields
where λ can be interpreted as a signal-to-noise ratio.
A lower interest rate has a smaller effect on π e 2 under opacity because people cannot tell whether it reflects a weak central bank (high τ), or either a negative demand shock (low d 1 ) or positive supply shock (high s 1 ). The signal i 1 is noisier so the optimal response to it is smaller. In the limiting case (σ 
This shows that a positive net demand shock has a beneficial effect on reputation under opacity, because rational agents partly attribute the rise in interest rates to a low inflation target τ and reduce their inflation expectations accordingly. In addition, the central bank enjoys lower inflation expectations π e 2 when its inflation target is higher than expected, because the public believes that the lower level of interest rates is due to negative net demand shocks instead.
The first-period outcomes are obtained by substituting (21) into (10), using (3) and (4), and imposing rational expectations, (π
6 For completeness,
T , because of a difference in the information sets at the end of the first period. In particular,
These expressions are similar to those under transparency, (16), (17) and (18) higher level of the first-period (nominal and ex ante real) interest rate under opacity to contain inflation. Rational expectations ensure that the levels of output are constant across the regimes, so the ex ante real interest rates are the same in both cases. Consequently, opacity brings about a higher first-period nominal interest rate. Although the ex ante real interest rate is the same in both cases, the higher level of inflation expectations exerts its influence. As a result, opacity leads to higher first-period inflation than transparency: τ < π
It appears that the adoption of transparency affects the strategic incentives of the central bank and makes investment in reputation more fruitful. It allows the public to identify the central bank's efforts to stabilize economic shocks, which produces a more accurate signal of the central bank's type and makes the public's expectations more responsive. Thus, transparency makes it more enticing for the central bank to invest in reputation, which results in a lower inflation bias than under opacity.
The size of the inflation bias under opacity is decreasing in the signal-to-noise ratio λ. A reduction in the variance of economic shocks, σ 2 d and σ 2 s , increases λ by diminishing the severity of opaqueness, so it makes the inflation bias smaller. However, a reduction in the ex ante uncertainty about the central bank's inflation target σ 2 τ decreases the signal-to-noise ratio λ and thereby increases the inflation bias. So, greater preference transparency actually makes a situation of economic opacity worse. As a result, a central bank that enjoys higher credibility (lower σ 2 τ ) has even more to gain from economic transparency. Intuitively, when the public faces less uncertainty about the central bank's type, it pays less attention to the interest rate, which reduces the payoff of investing in reputation and leads to a higher inflation bias under economic opacity.
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To complete the analysis of opacity, substitute (22) into (8), and use (25) and (24) to get the expected payoff for the central bank
Again, the expected payoff is decreasing in the expected inflation target
Comparison
The analysis of opacity above shows that inflation is lower under transparency (π
) but independent of economic shocks in both cases, and that the expected value of output conditional on the regime is equal (
This suggests that transparency would be socially beneficial. To assess this, assume for simplicity that the public shares the central bank's objective function. So, there is no principal-agent problem and (2) can be interpreted as a social welfare function. Using (19) and (26), the expected payoffs for the public, which is ignorant of the central bank's inflation target τ, equal
, it follows that the public always prefers transparency.
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However, central banks do not necessarily agree with the desirability of transparency. With an exogenous regime, (19) and (26) 
In other words, a strong central bank with a sufficiently low inflation target τ would prefer to publish its forecasts, whereas weak central banks with high inflation targets would rather be enveloped by secrecy. This suggests that if central banks could choose the regime themselves, strong central banks would have a greater incentive to adopt openness. Endogeneity of the regime is discussed in the next section.
Before continuing, recall that the analysis has focused on the publication of conditional forecasts, which are based on the assumption of a given level of the interest rate. However, the disclosure of unconditional forecasts, which incorporate anticipated changes in the policy instrument, need not have the same effect. In 9 This result is in sharp contrast to Walsh (1999) who shows that an explicit inflation target reduces the inflation bias when deviations from the target are considered costly. 10 This conclusion even holds for the more general social welfare function W
, where β S > 0 and 0 < δ S < 1.
fact, releasing the unconditional forecast for inflation leads to the worst possible outcome.
To understand this it is important to realize that the release of conditional central bank forecasts both reduces the uncertainty about the central bank's inflation target τ, and gives the central bank better incentives to invest in reputation since market expectations are more sensitive to the interest rate. The publication of the unconditional inflation forecast also reduces uncertainty because it directly reveals the inflation target. But, the public does not need the interest rate i 1 to infer τ, so that the behavioral incentive is absent. As a result, there is no reduction in the inflation bias.
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So, the publication of unconditional central bank forecasts could give rise to the full inflation bias. This suggests that it may be desirable to publish conditional forecasts that are based on an explicit interest rate (path) to guarantee the beneficial incentive effects of transparency.
12

Endogenous Regime
So far, the analysis was for an exogenous regime of transparency or opacity. However, the regime need not be imposed by the government but could be chosen by the central bank itself. The fact that central bank transparency in practice typically exceeds formal disclosure requirements suggests the relevance of making the regime endogenous.
The previous section shows that the regime preferred by the central bank depends on its inflation target τ. In particular, strong central banks favor transparency, whereas weaker types like opacity. But when central banks choose their own regime, the market realizes this and adjusts its beliefs accordingly, so that typically
Thus, there is a signaling effect associated with the choice of transparency regime. Since (19) and (26) reveal that the expected payoff to the central bank is decreasing in the expected inflation target E R 0 [τ], the adjustment of private sector expectations due to the signaling effect makes transparency more desirable and opacity more onerous. This market feedback from the choice of regime could be so strong that all types of central banks opt for transparency.
The analysis of the model with an endogenous regime is complicated by the fact that outcomes may arise (on or off the equilibrium path) in which not all central bank types select the same regime. This makes the model nonlinear and 11 Formally, (10), (3) and (4) give the unconditional central bank forecast for inflation, π
does not depend on τ as it is not based on the optimizing i 1 .
12 Tarkka and Mayes (1999) favor the publication of unconditional forecasts. But there is no inflation bias in their model, so behavioral incentives are immaterial.
closed-form solutions for the outcomes under opacity no longer exist. As a result, the linear updating equation (20) The central bank chooses the regime that produces the highest expected payoff subject to the equilibrium condition that for all central bank types, the market's expectations E R 0 [τ] are consistent with the regime choices that follow from those expectations. When the market's beliefs off the equilibrium path are also rational, transparency is the unique pure-strategy perfect equilibrium.
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Theorem 1 When the regime is endogenous the unique pure-strategy perfect equilibrium is that all central banks choose transparency (T ), assuming beliefs off the equilibrium path are rational.
The proof of this result appears in appendix A. Intuitively, weak central banks with high inflation targets are inclined to select opacity, because it obscures their true type. But the market realizes that opacity signals high inflation targets, so it harms the central bank's reputation as it increases
The corresponding rise in inflation expectations penalizes opaque central banks, which therefore have a greater incentive to be transparent. This causes opaque central banks with the lowest inflation targets τ to switch to transparency, which means that the remaining opaque central banks face an even stronger inducement to adopt transparency. In the end, market discipline suffices to make every central bank transparent when the regime is endogenous. It should be noted, however, that this conclusion is quite sensitive to the assumptions.
Discussion
The analysis above shows that transparency in the form of publication of central bank forecasts reduces the inflation bias and that market feedback can induce transparency when the regime is endogenous. This section assesses the robustness of these results and discusses empirical evidence.
The result that greater economic transparency makes inflation expectations more sensitive to policy actions and reduces the inflation bias is very robust. It also holds for a neo-monetarist or new-Keynesian transmission mechanism and also applies to the commonly used objective function
, where y * >ȳ. In addition, the beneficial effect of disclosure of central bank forecasts extends to information about the structure of the economy. Suppose the public is not sure about the level of the long-run real interest ratē r. This makes the nominal interest rate a noisier signal of the central bank's intentions. As a result, inflation expectations become less sensitive to the nominal interest rate which reduces the reputation effect that limits the inflation bias. 14, 15 Furthermore, the reputation mechanism formalized in this paper, namely inference based on policy actions, also applies if the prior distribution of the inflation target τ is not normal. However, a different prior distribution for τ would generally no longer yield a linear updating rule and thereby preclude closed-form solutions. The reputation mechanism also remains relevant for longer horizons when central bank preferences are subject to change, for instance due to new appointments to the monetary policy committee. This means that the beneficial incentive effects found in the two-period model persist over time. In addition, as people gradually learn more about the central bank as time passes, the reduction in preference uncertainty only increases the benefits of transparency about forecasts. As a result, the conclusions are likely to generalize albeit at the cost of analytical tractability, similar to Faust and Svensson (2001) who focus on transparency about control errors and have to resort to simulations to solve their infinite horizon model.
There is anecdotal support for the relevance of the argument that the publication of central bank forecasts has a beneficial incentive effect. For instance, the Bank of England started publishing its forecasts in Inflation Reports in 1993, when monetary policy was still basically set by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. According to King (1997, p. 440) , the current Governor of the Bank of England, "The original objective of the Inflation Report was, it is fair to say, to act as a disciplining device on Government. The Bank's report would set out its views of the likely implications for inflation of decisions taken (or not taken) by the Chancellor."
After an earlier version of the present paper (Geraats 2000) was circulated, 14 More precisely, assume thatr ∼ N ρ, σ 2 ρ , independently of τ, ε
s ≡ −λ r so that greater uncertainty about the natural real interest rate (σ 2 ρ ) reduces λ r and increases the inflation bias. 15 Model uncertainty could complicate the interpretation of central bank forecasts. For instance, if the public does not know the natural rate of outputȳ, it may be unable to infer the economic shocks d t and s t from the forecasts of output and inflation. In that case, central bank forecasts need to be supplemented by the central bank's estimate of the natural rate of output to achieve transparency. Such opaqueness about economic models may be due to lack of professional consensus (Cukierman 2002). formal empirical evidence on the relation between the disclosure of central bank forecasts and the level of inflation has been presented by Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne (2002) . They use the central bank survey by Fry et al. (2000) to construct a transparency index for 87 countries based on the extent to which central banks publish forecasts. They find that greater transparency reduces average inflation, even after controlling for macroeconomic features, like openness and per capita output, and institutional characteristics, including political instability and central bank independence. The negative relationship between transparency and inflation holds for inflation and monetary targeting frameworks, but not for countries that have abandoned control over monetary policy by adopting an exchange rate peg. This is consistent with the prediction of the present paper that the publication of central bank forecasts improves the incentives for the central bank to reduce the inflation bias.
The result that an endogenous choice of regime leads to transparency is less robust and hinges on several assumptions.
First, it requires that the central bank's objective function is linear in output, so that prior expectations E R 0 [τ] enter linearly. Second, it relies on the strong assumption of rationality of market expectations both on and off the equilibrium path. If the public uses Bayesian updating to form its expectations, a situation of secrecy could persist and unravel to the transparency equilibrium only gradually. 16 Third, the result may no longer hold if the prior distribution for τ is not normal. For instance, if τ has a distribution with bounded support, the central banks with the highest τ are less reluctant to become opaque because the reputational penalty for opacity, the difference between
, is smaller compared to a distribution with infinite support. So, there could be a threshold equilibrium such that central banks with τ >τ choose opacity and those with τ <τ adopt transparency.
Fourth, there could be bureaucratic or political motives for obfuscation. Like any bureaucracy, central banks may have incentives to hide mistakes or embarrassing forecasts, or to cherish the information rents that secrecy brings, like extensive media attention (see Stiglitz 1999) . Or, central bankers may simply find it burdensome to substantiate their decisions. In addition, a central bank that lacks operational independence or a clear political mandate may envelop itself in secrecy to obtain insulation from political pressures (Geraats 2001) . Thus, the movement towards central bank independence during the last few decades may have con- 16 Interestingly, the wave of central bank transparency that has emerged over the last two decades began in New Zealand in 1989, which made its central bank subject to a contract (Policy Targets Agreement) and disclosure requirements (Monetary Policy Statements). Its success may have started the Bayesian updating process and triggered greater transparency elsewhere.
tributed to the endogenous adoption of transparency by central banks.
A striking feature of the result that the negative market feedback in response to secrecy could induce transparency is that it applies more widely: It holds for any problem in which the expected payoff of an agency of unobservable type τ equals E
, and τ has a normal distribution. Intuitively, the restrictions on the coefficients imply that with transparency, the agency benefits less if its type is different from the market's expectation, and that transparency is not worse than opacity ex ante.
The finding that reputational concerns could provide a sufficiently strong incentive to achieve information disclosure may be useful in other contexts. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has established "Codes of Good Practices on Transparency" in monetary, financial and fiscal policies, but does not enforce implementation. Instead, it appears to rely on the hope that lack of adherence is penalized by international financial markets so that countries adopt these standards 'voluntarily'. This paper suggests that reliance on market discipline could indeed enforce transparency (or other international standards). However, if market expectations are not rational off the equilibrium path but instead are determined through Bayesian updating, then a situation of secrecy could prevail for a long time and a stimulus may be required before market feedback starts operating.
17 A further analysis of these interesting issues is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
Last but not least, there are other effects of transparency besides reputational incentives. For instance, it could affect the stabilization of economic shocks, which need not be beneficial. A further discussion is provided in the survey paper on central bank transparency by Geraats (2002) . It shows that the theoretical literature is by no means unequivocal about the benefits of transparency, which may explain why there is still considerable variation in the degree of transparency of monetary policy in practice.
Conclusion
Transparency has become a key feature of monetary policy and most central banks have adopted the practice of publishing forward looking analysis. This paper analyzes the reputational effects related to transparency of monetary policy, focusing on the publication of central bank forecasts. It shows how such transparency enhances the central bank's ability to build reputation and reduces the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy. This could explain why the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England, which suffered from histories of relatively high inflation, had an incentive to become the trendsetters in transparency. It also shows the importance of transparency for a young central bank, like the European Central Bank. Moreover, the finding that publication of forecasts reduces inflation is consistent with cross-section empirical evidence.
In addition, the paper shows that central banks with inflationary preferences are reluctant to adopt transparency since it reveals their true intents. However, when the choice of transparency is endogenous, secrecy signals an inflationary central bank and the public rationally increases its inflation expectations. This harmful effect on the reputation of the central bank makes secrecy less attractive. This leads to the main result of the paper that market discipline could provide such a strong incentive that even inflationary central banks choose to be transparent. Such reputational concerns apply more widely and help to explain why transparency often goes beyond formal disclosure requirements.
A Appendix
This appendix formally analyzes the model when the transparency regime is endogenous and proves theorem 1.
When the regime R is endogenous, cases may arise (on or off the equilibrium path) in which central banks choose transparency (T ) or opacity (O) depending on their type τ. Under transparency, the inflation target τ can still be perfectly inferred from i 1 so this has no effect on the results, except that generally E T 0 [τ] = τ. However, under opacity, the analysis is complicated by the fact that τ has a truncated normal distribution with a support corresponding to the subset of types τ that are opaque. This means that the linear updating rule (20) no longer applies. As a consequence, there are no closed-form solutions under opacity. However, it is still possible to obtain analytical results for the expected payoff for all central banks.
Lemma 1 Letτ be the unique threshold inflation target τ (if any) such that central banks prefer transparency if τ <τ and opacity if τ >τ. Then, for this thresholdτ the expected payoff of a central bank τ under transparency T or opacity O is given by:
where R ∈ {T,O},
the adjusted signal-to-noise ratio λ (τ) satisfies 0 < λ (τ) < 1 and equals
and φ (.) denotes the probability density function of the standard normal distribution and Φ (.) the corresponding cumulative density function.
Proof. Following the intuition in section 3.3, it is an educated guess that any thresholdτ is such that central banks with τ <τ (τ >τ) prefer transparency (opacity). This conjecture is shown to be correct below. More precisely, the thresholdτ satisfies
The threshold does not affect updating under transparency since the inflation target τ can still be perfectly inferred from i 1 . So, E T 0 [U|τ] remains the same and equals (19).
However, the updating under opacity is affected by the thresholdτ because τ now has a truncated normal distribution with support τ >τ. So, the updating equation under opacity has the expression familiar from truncated regression:
and σ
. This means that (π
However, the only thing that matters for the optimizing central bank is dπ e 2 /di 1 (for a given level ofτ). Hence, the relevant updating coefficient under opacity becomes
Using (10) this reduces to
is convex in z, 18 with a horizontal asymptote of 0 as z → −∞ and an asymptote of z as z → ∞, it follows that 0 < ∂ ∂z φ(z) 1−Φ(z) < 1 and 0 < λ (τ) < λ < 1. The existence of a threshold makes inflation expectations less sensitive to the interest rate under opacity, because there is relatively less uncertainty about the inflation target. Note that limτ →−∞ λ (τ) = λ, which corresponds to opacity under the exogenous regime in section 3.2.
To obtain the opacity results in case of a thresholdτ, simply substitute λ (τ) for λ in (22), (23), (24) and (25). 19 So,
is given by (26) after substituting λ (τ) for λ. This completes the derivation of (27). 18 For a proof that f (z) ≡ φ(z) 1−Φ(z) is convex, see Sampford (1953) . As a corollary, f (−z) = (27) it is straightforward to show that the normalized threshold inflation targetz ≡ (τ −τ) /σ τ must satisfy (28) 20 .
The proof that transparency is the unique pure-strategy perfect equilibrium when the market's beliefs off the equilibrium path are rational (theorem 1), makes use of three additional results. First, there exists no threshold equilibrium in which some central banks decide to adopt transparency and some opacity (lemma 2). Second, opacity cannot be an equilibrium because central banks with low inflation targets prefer to deviate (lemma 3). Third, it is verified that transparency is indeed an equilibrium (lemma 4).
Lemma 2 There exists no pure-strategy perfect equilibrium that features a thresholdτ as described in lemma 1, such that central banks with τ <τ decide to adopt transparency (T ) and those with τ >τ opacity (O).
Proof. Suppose that there is a threshold equilibrium such that a central bank with inflation targetτ is indifferent between transparency and opacity. Then the normalized thresholdz (if any) satisfies (28). This equation has the structure z = C 1˜φ
T < 0 for anyτ, it follows that C 1 > 1, C 2 > 0 and C 3 > 0. In addition, C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 are continuous inτ, with finite limits asτ → ±∞. Momentarily treating z andτ as independent variables, C 1˜φ
+ C 3 is strictly positive and convex inz as φ/Φ and φ/ (1 − Φ) are convex. Furthermore, C 1˜φ
+C 3 for anyz andτ, includingτ = σ τ˜z +τ. Hence, the right-hand side of (28) is strictly greater thanz for anyz. This means that no threshold equilibrium exists.
Lemma 3 There exists no pure-strategy perfect equilibrium in which all central banks choose opacity (O), assuming beliefs off the equilibrium path are rational.
Proof. Now, suppose that opacity is a perfect equilibrium, so E + C 3 . This implies that a thresholdτ exists so that opacity cannot be a perfect equilibrium.
Lemma 4 There exists a pure-strategy perfect equilibrium such that all central banks choose transparency (T ), assuming beliefs off the equilibrium path are rational.
Proof. Finally, suppose that transparency is a perfect equilibrium, so E + C 3 for anyz andτ, includingτ = σ τ˜z +τ. This implies that there exists no thresholdτ such that deviation from transparency is preferred. Therefore, transparency is a pure-strategy perfect equilibrium. Theorem 1 When the regime is endogenous the unique pure-strategy perfect equilibrium is that all central banks choose transparency (T ), assuming beliefs off the equilibrium path are rational. 21 Without the restriction that beliefs off the equilibrium path (E O 0 [τ]) are rational, transparency would not be a perfect equilibrium because there would always exist types with sufficiently large τ that prefer to deviate. This is a consequence of the unbounded support of the distribution of τ.
Proof. Assuming beliefs off-the equilibrium path are rational, lemma 4 shows that transparency is a pure-strategy perfect equilibrium. Other potential candidates for a pure-strategy perfect equilibrium are the threshold equilibrium, which is refuted by lemma 2, and the opacity equilibrium, which is refuted by lemma 3. Hence, transparency is the unique pure-strategy perfect equilibrium when beliefs off-the equilibrium path are rational.
Note that this conclusion holds regardless of the degree of opacity, which depends negatively on λ, with λ = 1 amounting to the transparency case. So, transparency is the equilibrium even when the central bank has the opportunity to choose an opacity regime with λ arbitrarily close to one.
In addition, inspecting the proofs reveals that theorem 1 holds not only for this particular transparency model but for any other model that features the expected payoff E and τ has a normal distribution. So, the result that an endogenous regime gives rise to transparency holds more generally.
B Appendix
This appendix follows up on footnote 4 and proves that there cannot be a rational expectations equilibrium under transparency for which v T = 0 and π T 1 = τ + β. The proof is by contradiction. Note that a rational expectations equilibrium requires both the optimality of central bank behavior and the rationality of private sector expectations. In addition, note that the first order condition for optimization yields (cf (10))
Substitute this into (3) and (4) to get
Now suppose that v = 0 and π 1 = τ + β is a rational expectations equilibrium under transparency. Optimality of π 1 = τ + β requires that dπ e 2 /di 1 = 0, which means that the private sector completely ignores i 1 when it sets π e 2 . If the private sector ignores i 1 but uses all other available information, π e 2 =τ + β. If instead the private sector uses i 1 , it can perfectly infer τ from i 1 using equation (29) and set π e 2 = τ +β, which is equal to the inflation outcome π 2 = τ +β. So, the private sector would be irrational to ignore i 1 and have dπ e 2 /di 1 = 0. But this contradicts the conjecture that v = 0 and π 1 = τ + β is a rational expectations equilibrium under transparency, which completes the proof.
